PhoneDog, LLC, an "interactive mobile news and reviews resource," filed suit against former employee Noah Kravitz on July 15, 2011, for ownership of a Twitter account Kravitz used while he was employed by PhoneDog. As a product reviewer for PhoneDog, Kravitz was allegedly given use of a Twitter account with the handle @PhoneDog_Noah to promote PhoneDog's services. PhoneDog claimed that after his employment ended, Kravitz changed the Twitter handle to @noahkravitz and continued use of the account, even though PhoneDog requested Kravitz relinquish use.

The complaint asserts four claims for relief. First, PhoneDog alleged that Kravitz willfully and intentionally obtained and misppropriated confidential information from PhoneDog, primarily the passwords to its Twitter accounts. According to PhoneDog, this information "would be of substantial value to PhoneDog's competitors" if it leaked. PhoneDog claimed that Kravitz used this confidential information to his own advantage, constituting trade secret misappropriation.

The second and third claims for relief allege that Kravitz intentionally and negligently interfered with PhoneDog's prosepctive economic advantage by using the confidential information to disrupt PhoneDog's business with current and prospective users. 

Finally, PhoneDog claimed that Kravitz unlawfully converted the Twitter account to his own use by changing the handle, even after PhoneDog requested that he relinquish the account.

PhoneDog requested that the court issue a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction preventing Kravitz from using its confidential information. Additionally, PhoneDog asserted it suffered $340,000 in compensatory damages as a result of the alleged conversion. To arrive at this figure, PhoneDog assumed that, according to industry standards, Twitter followers are valued at $2.50 per month each. Since Kravitz's account has approximately 17,000 users, PhoneDog has suffered damages of $42,500 per month since October 2010.

On October 4, 2011, Kravitz moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(1), and failure to state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6). On the jurisdictional issue, Kravitz asserted that the amount in controvery, if any, could not exceed $8,000, which is under the statutory limit, a federal court could not hear the case. Kravitz used sites such as tweetvalue.com and whatsmytwitteraccountworth.com to value the account.

Kravitz also claimed that PhoneDog could not satisfy the misappropriation of trade secrets claim, because any information obtained by Kravitz (including the identity of the account's followers and its password) are not trade secrets under California law. Regarding claims of intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, Kravitz alleged that PhoneDog could not establish the existence of a current economic relationship between PhoneDog and the Twitter account followers, an essential element of each claim. Finally, Kravitz contended that PhoneDog's complaint did not establish ownership or the right to possess the Twitter account, which would require the court to dismiss the conversion claim.

After both PhoneDog and Kravitz filed subsequent pleadings related to the motion to dismiss (PhoneDog Response; Kravitz Reply), the court issued an order granting in part and denying in part the motion. The court denied the motion with respect to lack of jurisdiction, stating that the determination of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction is so tied up with PhoneDog's claims that it could not be resolved in this early stage. Turning to the substantive claims, the court granted Kravitz's motion with respect to the claims of intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, finding that PhoneDog failed to assert essential elements of the claim, including the existence of economic relationships and a duty of care. The court denied, however, the motion with respect to the misappropriation of trade secrets and conversion claims. The court also granted PhoneDog leave to amend its complaint.

The amended complaint, filed on November 29, 2011, alleges that PhoneDog has economic relationships with its users, including CNBC and Fox News. The amended complaint also claimed that Kravitz owed a duty of care to PhoneDog as a former agent of the company.

The Antioch Papers, an investigative journalism and media arts website, maintains and "open archive for primary source materials that document the institutional life of Antioch College and by extension Antioch University."  Source materials have been gathered through publicly accessible archives and through submissions by institutional whistle blowers.

On February 29, 2008, Antioch University sent a letter to The Antioch Papers demanding the removal of documents that the University alleged included attorney/client privileged communications and proprietary business and financial planning documents.

The Antioch Papers responded in a letter dated March 12, 2008, asserting a First Amendment right to publish the materials at issue.

Target Corporation, a chain retailer, filed a lawsuit against an initially unknown Internet user with the handle “Target Sucks” for copyright infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets for allegedly posting information on various retail-employee forums and blogs. Target identified the user as Charles Emmerson William Harris based on the information it received after subpoening Internet providers. Harris allegedly posted Target’s "Asset Protection Directives," an in-house theft prevention manual, on several websites critical of Target.

Target asserted in its two-count complaint that the user “acquired a copy of Target’s AP Directives from a recently terminated Target employee, Scott Hundt.” Target alleges that Hundt emailed a copy of the AP Directives to the user, as well as posting that information on the website www.targetunion.org. After learning of the post, Target threatened legal action against Hundt, who admitted wrongdoing and cooperated with Target's subsequent efforts to block the further dissemination of the AP Directives. Target and Hundt emailed cease-and-desist orders to the user and received no reply. Target alleges that instead of complying with its demands, the user posted the AP directives to “various retail-employee forums on the Internet.” Target sent cease-and-desist letters to those forums, and the AP Directives were removed. Target asserted that the user’s “dissemination of the Target AP Directives is deliberate, willful, malicious, oppressive, and without regard to Target’s proprietary rights.” Compl. ¶ 33. Further, the complaint asserted that user had disclosed “such information without the express or implied consent of Target, for the benefit of himself.” Compl. ¶ 42.

In an effort to discover the identity of the then-anonymous user, Target subpoenaed AOL, Yahoo!, Hotmail, Qwest, Comcast, and UPS.  Compl. Ex. B. The court granted these subpoenas. Based on the information it obtained through investigation, Target identified the user as Charles Harris. Target claimed that it confirmed this identification based on the documents relating to IP address and P.O. Box information it received in response to its subpoenas to website, email, mail, and internet providers. Req. for Service.

On 04/10/2007, a civil summons was issued for  Charles Emerson William Harris. However, attempts to locate Harris for service failed. On 12/21/2007, the court granted a motion for service by publication to the Fulton County Daily Report. This notice was posted on 01/15/2008.  On 07/16/2008 the case was dismissed for want of prosecution pursuant to Local Rule 41.3(A)(3) because the case had been pending for more than 6 months without a substantial proceeding of record.  

On March 4, 2009, Monex Deposit Company and Monex Credit Company (collectively "Monex"), two companies in the precious metals business, filed a lawsuit suit against Jason Gilliam, Richard Gilliam, and Steven Bowman for publishing allegedly defamatory statements on the website MonexFRAUD.com and attempting to extort money from Monex.  Monex initially sued in California state court, but the Gilliams removed the case to federal court.

In its complaint, Monex claims that the Gilliams and Bowman threatened to "continue to libel Monex on their website, . . . share information with government regulators, and . . . interfere with Monex's relationships with investors and banks" unless the company paid them $15 million dollars.  According the complaint, the defendants called Monex's president a "ruthless sociopath" and the firm's sales pitch "flat-out lies," in addition to other comments.  Monex alleges that the defendants made these false statements on MonexFRAUD.com and in comments posted on other websites, including YouTube and Digg.

In addition to defamation and extortion, Monex's complaint alleges cyberpiracy, unfair competition, racketeering, interference with contract, attempted conversion, trade libel, interference with prospective economic advantage, and trade secret misappropriation. The Gilliams, father and son, allegedly lost approximately $32,000 with Monex.  On March 16, Jason Gilliam filed counter claims against Monex, including racketeering and breach of fiduciary duties.

On March 24, 2009, a federal court in California granted Monex's request for a temporary restraining order against the Gilliams and Bowman, expiring on April 7, 2009. The temporary restraining order prohibits them from taking any steps to extort money from Monex by (1) threatening to publish information about Monex on any forum or share information about Monex with third parties, or (2) threatening to defame Monex or its employees.  The order also barred them from retaining, disclosing, or using any Monex trade secret or proprietary information. 

The court also ordered the Gilliams and Bowman to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue, continuing the terms of the temporary restraining order until judgment or dismissal.  If granted, the preliminary injunction would also bar the defendants from "publishing or republishing any negative statements about Monex on any website" and require them to "remove, from any website over which they have sufficient control, all negative material about Monex that they have published or republished there, and to stop using the word MonexFRAUD."  It would also bar them from operating the MonexFRAUD website or any "other websites critical of Monex."  

Update:

04/09/09 -The court issued a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the defendants from (1) making any efforts to extort money from Monex by threatening to publish or share information about Monex or defame Monex or its employees; (2) operating www.MonexFRAUD.com or any other website using the Monex name in combination with any modifier that implies illegal, unlawful or unethical conduct; (3) publishing or republishing on any website, including www.MonexFRAUD.com, any statement that "Monex does not have title to or the ability to deliver precious metals sold under contract to any Monex customer; that Monex was expelled from the National Futures Association for fraud; that Monex operates a boiler room; that Monex violates any federal or state statutes regulating the business operations of Monex; that Monex has been charged by the Internal Revenue Service with tax evasion; and that Monex fails to accurately disclose to customers account and trading terms (collectively "Prohibited Statements"); (4) disclosing, using, or retaining any trade secret documentation or other proprietary information belonging to Monex.  The injunction also requires the defendants to remove all previously published Prohibited Statements within 24 hours.  It does not prohibit the defendants from (a) making statements regarding their own business dealings with Monex, including losses they have sustained; or (b) communicating with any governmental entity concerning matters within the scope of that entity's legislative, administrative, or regulatory responsibilities.

05/07/2009- Monex filed an amended complaint in district court. 

ViroLogic, a biotechnology company, sued ten anonymous users of the Yahoo! Finance forum dedicated to it, after they allegedly posted internal ViroLogic information and made statements critical of the company and its officers. The original complaint included claims for defamation, trade libel, misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition, and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. ViroLogic subsequently amended its complaint, limiting its claims to misappropriation of trade secrets and unfair competition. 

ViroLogic subpoenaed Yahoo! to uncover the identity of the Doe defendants. Yahoo! notified the Does of the subpoena, and one of them (Doe 1) filed a motion to quash.  Doe 1 also filed a motion to strike the complaint under California's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the lawsuit was an attempt to stifle his right to free speech. 

Meanwhile, ViroLogic moved for permission to take limited discovery regarding Doe 1.  The court granted the company permission to take his deposition, with the proviso that ViroLogic's attorneys could not reveal Doe 1's identity to ViroLogic employees. In the deposition, ViroLogic's lawyers discovered that Doe 1 had previously been a consultant for the company, and that he was closely related to a current company employee. The lawyers asked the court for permission to reveal this information, including Doe 1's identity, to ViroLogic, so that it could make a case in opposition to Doe 1's anti-SLAPP motion to strike.

In a subsequent hearing, the court granted Doe 1's motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute and denied ViroLogic's motion to permit its lawyers to disclose Doe 1's identity to it. The court ruled that the Doe 1's posts were an exercise of his protected right to free speech, and that ViroLogic had failed to show a sufficient likelihood of success should the case proceed.  The court dismissed the case and awarded attorneys' fees to Doe 1. It denied Doe 1's motion to quash the Yahoo! subpoena because dismissing the case mooted the issue.

ViroLogic appealed the decision and argued that the lower court had violated its due process rights by granting the anti-SLAPP motion to strike without permitting it to fully prepare a defense to that motion through access to Doe 1's identity. The California appeals court held that ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion to strike without giving ViroLogic access to Doe 1's identity deprived the company of a meaningful opportunity to oppose the motion. It recognized that Doe 1 has a right to anonymous speech, but reasoned that this right had to be balanced against ViroLogic's due process rights. See ViroLogic, Inc. v. Doe, 2004 WL 1941335, at *1, 5-7 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2004).

The appeals court set out a standard for lower courts to consider when deciding whether a plaintiff has shown "good cause" to discover a defendant's identity after an anti-SLAPP motion has been filed. Under this standard, the plaintiff seeking discovery must show: (1) the plaintiff's claims describe actionable conduct by the defendant; and (2) discovery of the defendant's identity is necessary for the plaintiff to present evidence in opposition to the special motion to strike. The court also indicated that, given the early stage when anti-SLAPP motions are usually litigated, it is not appropriate to impose upon the plaintiff a burden of supporting its claims with evidence.  See ViroLogic, Inc., 2004 WL 1941335, at *6. Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the appeals court determined that ViroLogic had shown "good cause" to uncover Doe 1's identity. It therefore reversed the lower court's grant of the anti-SLAPP motion to strike and its award of attorneys' fees to Doe 1, and directed the trial court to enter an order permitting disclosure of Doe 1's identity to ViroLogic.

UPDATE:

On 3/15/2005, the trial court permitted the disclosure of the identity of Doe. A series of case management conferences followed this disclosure. These conferences appear to have produced a settlement.

On 11/28/2005, ViroLogic filed a notice of settlement and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

Deep Blue Marine, its CEO Wilf Blum, and Alexander Lindale LLC sued former Deep Blue operations manager Edward Krajewski after Krajewski criticized the plaintiffs and allegedly disclosed Deep Blue proprietary information on several online investor forums. The plaintiffs sought an injunction in Utah federal court against Krajewski to prevent him from posting any further criticism or materials. They also brought claims for defamation, false light, intentional interference with economic advantage, breach of contract (including publication of trade secrets), and breach of convenant of good faith.

In May 2008, Deep Blue moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Krajewski. The court decided the motion ex parte after satisfying itself that Krajewski had received notice of the hearing. It granted the motion, issuing an order prohibiting Krajewski from

In July 2008, Krajewski, acting pro se, filed a motion for an extension of time to file a brief. He also submitted an affidavit explaining that he lacked sufficient financial resources to litigate the case in Utah and requesting that the court transfer the case to Pennsylvania, his home state. On July 22, the court denied the motion for an extension of time to file a brief, noting that Krajewski did not identify what motion he would be addressing and that no motions were currently pending. The court added that Krajewski could inititiate a motion and file a brief in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules.

Update:

1/15/2009 - Action dismissed without prejudice subject to parties' settlement agreement