On December 16, 2010, Robert Scott filed a pro se complaint in the Southern District of New York against Berkeley College and WorldStarHipHop, Inc. (hereafter "WorldStar"). Berkeley College is private college in New York; WorldStar, a Nevada corporation, operates and maintains a video website.

According to Scott's complaint, a fight broke out in a Berkeley College class between Scott's current and former girlfriend in November 2010. During the classroom altercation, Scott got involved and repeatedly hit one of the girls. A classmate (Mr. Seymour) recorded the fight on his cell phone and sent it to WorldStar's website where it was posted as "Disgraceful: College Fight In NYC Breaks Out Between A Guy, His Girl & Another Girl In Class! (Man Strong Arm's(sic) The Student. Hitting Her With Body Shots)."

Shortly thereafter in December 2010, the classmate assigned his copyright in the video recording to Scott. Scott then sent take-down notices under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) to WorldStar, claiming the website was displaying the video without his [now copyright-owner's] written consent. WorldStar did not take down the video; this suit followed.

In his complaint, Scott alleged copyright infringement under the Copyright Act of 1976 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. He sought a temporary and permanent injunction, and $28,000 in statutory damages.

On April 18, 2011, Berkeley filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. In the motion, Berkeley alleged that Scott did not own a valid copyright, and furthermore that Berkeley was unrelated to co-defendant WorldStar and that Scott failed to show how Berkeley College was responsible for uploading the video. Berkeley argued that it was not accountable for copyright infringement because a "member" of its college posted the video. Berkeley also asked the court to take judicial notice that Scott was involved in two related proceedings with them at the time, both involving a gender discrimination claim filed by Scott with the New York State Human Rights Division against Berkeley due to the disparate discipline that Scott and the two girls involved received as a result of the fight (Scott was expelled, but the girls were allowed to return to school).

Scott filed a much longer amended complaint on May 24, 2011, with five claims. In it, he included claims against Berkeley College for sex discrimination and retaliation for filing a sex discrimination complaint, both in violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1681. He also included a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against Berkeley College. The copyright infringement claim returned, along with allegations of right to privacy violations pursuant to New York's Civil Rights Law.

Scott alleged that Seymour assigned him the exclusive rights of the copyrighted video for $1 on December 3, 2010. The next day Scott registered the work with the United States Copyright Office (Registration No. PA 1-727-922). He then claimed he contacted WorldStar and Berkeley College and demanded that they both "cease and desist further infringement" of the video. He further alleged that WorldStar "disregarded the statutory requirement of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act" and continued to publish the work. With respect to Berkeley College, he claims that the school infringed his copyright when it submitted the video as evidence in defense of the gender discrimination claim, and  downloaded a copy of the video from WorldStar and distributed it through the school's blackboard network and to its law firm. Scott sought a temporary and permanent injunction, $30,000 in statutory damages and $400,000 damages against Berkeley College for the gender discrimination claims.

On June 29, 2011, Berkeley filed a Motion to Dismiss Scott's Amended Complaint claiming that Scott's new claims were "patently meritless under well establish[ed] law." Berkeley argued that Scott could not use his alleged copyright to suppress evidence of his own wrongdoing, and that itssubmission of the video into evidence was fair use. Berkeley also discussed the public policy issues of copyright laws being used to "shield primary evidence of wrongful conduct in a judicial or administrative proceeding," and alleged that Scott had bad motives in purchasing the copyright of the video.

Scott filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on July 29, 2011. Berkeley replied on August 12, 2011.

On October 25, 2011, a judge issued an order on Berkeley's Motion to Dismiss, dismissing the case against Berkeley in its entirety with prejudice. The court dismissed the federal claims of copyright infringement, gender discrimination, and retaliation for filing a complaint. In particular, the court held that Berkeley's use of the video in its legal defense was a fair use. The court then declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state claims of invasion of privacy and negligent infliction of emotional distress, in the absence of pending federal claims. Scott has appealed the decision.

In the midst of the above proceedings, WorldStar had not filed an answer or responded to the lawsuit. A default was entered against WorldStar on October 6, 2011. 

On November 19, 2011, WorldStar filed a Motion to Set Aside Default claiming that it did not willfully default and that it was not properly served by Scott. In the motion, WorldStar also argued affirmative defenses against Scott's claims. They argued that there was a nonexclusive license from Seymour when he first posted the video and that "any assignment was subject to the exisiting license."  (Note: This language is from the court's order on May 3, 2012, quoting WorldStar's arguments from this motion. The copy of WorldStar's memorandum of law available through PACER is incomplete.)

The court granted WorldStar's Motion to Set Aside Default on December 12, 2011.

WorldStar then filed a Motion to Dismiss Scott's Amended Complaint on January 13, 2012. WorldStar argued that they are protected from Scott's copyright infringement claim under the "Safe Harbor" provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), and had no actual knowledge that the video was infringing. WorldStar argued that Scott's letter sent on December 4, 2010, could not be used as evidence of actual knowledge of infringement because it did not comply with the requirements of 17 U.S.C. § 512(3)(b)(i). WorldStar also argued that "plaintiff had non-copyright reasons for wanting to suppress the video, specifically the Berkeley College disciplinary actions." WorldStar also claimed that § 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) protected it from Scott's state right of privacy claims.

On February 6, 2012, Scott filed an opposition to WorldStar's Motion to Dismiss. In it, Scott alleged that WorldStar was outside of the scope of the DMCA's safe harbor provisions and the scope of § 230 immunity because it was not "doing business as a internet service provider" at the time the video was posted, because it was then in default as a corporation in Nevada. In addition, Scott asserted that WorldStar did not have a designated agent to receive take down notifications or a place on its website with information on where to send take-down notices, and that it did not provide that information to the U.S. Copyright Office, as required by the DMCA.

WorldStar replied on February 23, 2012, claiming that its corporate parent company's default status is not relevant to the "internet service provider" definition of either the DMCA or the CDA. WorldStar further argued that the DMCA safe habor provisions only allow the copyright owner injunctive relief, and that this is moot because the video has "long since been removed." WorldStar also argued that Scott's amended complaint contained no allegations of a lack of a designated agent.

Scott filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56(a) on March 1, 2012.

The district court judge issued an order on WorldStar's Motion to Dismiss on May 3, 2012. The court dismissed the right of privacy claim, but allowed the copyright infringement claim to proceed. The court held that Scott stated a plausible claim for copyright infringement because he alleged that he became a copyright owner on December 3, 2010, and that WorldStar kept a copy of his video on their website without his authorization after that time. The court further held that WorldStar's two affirmative defenses were insufficient. First, the court found there was no evidence that WorldStar's nonexclusive license was in writing, as required by 17 U.S.C. § 205 for  the alleged license to prevail over a later transfer of rights to Scott. Second, in regards to the DMCA "Safe Harbor" provisions, the court held that even though Scott did not comply with statutory requirements of sending take-down notices according to § 512(c), WorldStar waived any objection by failing to request that Scott resubmit the notice or otherwise to take reasonable steps to obtain proper notification.

The right of publicity claim was dismissed because plaintiff did not allege that WorldStar used the video for advertising purposes, and furthermore it was within the "newsworthiness" exception because it was a recording of actual events that took place in public and was a "matter of valid public interest."

The court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment without prejudice because his motion did not comply with court rules. 

On June 11, 2012, World Star filed an answer to Scott's Amended Complaint. The complaint raises several affirmative defenses, including lack of personal jurisdiction and Scott's lack of standing due to failure to register the work in question with the Copyright Office pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 411.

Update: 

On June 12, 2012, Scott filed a motion to strike the affirmative defenses raised in World Star's answer, claiming that the affirmative defenses were either waived for failure to raise at the motion to dismiss stage and for World Star's failure to timely file the answer under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A). On October 28, 2012, World Star filed an opposition to the motion to strike, acknowledging the untimeliness of the answer but arguing that the delay was not prejudicial to Scott. On November 14, the court denied Scott's motion to strike as to all affirmative defenses except lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that defense precluded by Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h).

Junie Hoang, the stage name of Asian actress Huong Huang, filed an anonymous "Jane Doe" complaint in the Western District of Washington against the Internet Movie Database website, IMDb.com, and its parent company, Amazon.com, on October 13, 2011.

Hoang, who lives in Texas, has been a user of IMDb.com since 2003 and a subscriber to IMDbPro since 2008. She was using the services to help her connect with casting directors and to obtain acting roles. She did not put her age in her profile, but alleges that IMDb.com included it at a later point in time. She alleges that IMDb.com "took the personal information she provided during the subscription process [from her credit card] and added it to her online profile without her authorization." She also alleges that IMDb.com "scour[ed] public records" to discover her date of birth. She asked for her birthdate to be taken down, but IMDb.com has refused.

Hoang alleges that revealing her true name and age on IMDb.com has harmed her career because "in the entertainment industry, youth is king." Hoang was 40 years old at the time of filing. In addition, she alleges a "double-whammy effect" because she cannot get "forty-year-old roles" because she looks younger than she is and cannot portray the role of a forty-year-old woman.

In her complaint, Hoang alleges four causes of action:

1. Breach of contract (of IMDbPro's Subscriber Agreement and incorporated Privacy Policy);  
2. Fraud;
3. Violation of Washington Privacy Act, RCW 9.73.030; and
4. Violation of Washington Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.

She included Amazon.com in her complaint because she alleges that the company "aided and abetted IMDb's wrongful conduct," and was aware of IMDb's procedures of cross-referencing credit card information with public records to gather as much information as possible about each subscriber. She sought an injunction to remove her personal information from IMDb, as well as $75,000 in comensatory damages, $1 million in punitive damages, and an award of costs and fees.

On November 9, 2011, defendants responded with two Motions to Dismiss: one pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim; and another pursuant to Rule 10(a), arguing that "Jane Doe" should not be able to proceed anyonymously. On the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Amazon and IMDb argued that the display of the birthdate was "an accurate fact," and that Doe's claims about IMDb's practices were "pure speculation." The defendants also noted that even if Doe's claims were true, "plaintiff consented to such use of information when she subscribed to the IMDbPro service." 

On November 28, 2011, plaintiff filed oppositions to defendant's Rule 12 (b)(6) motion and Rule 10(a) motion, and simultaneously filed a cross-motion to proceed anonymously due to the "unique circumstances" in the case. Plaintiff argued that she should be allowed to proceed anonymously because disclosure of her identity would subject her to "severe retaliation, harassment and ridicule," including retaliation by defendants, who she claims "have a reputation of striking back at consumers who complain about their unauthorized publication of personal information." 

Defendants filed replies in support of their motions on December 2, 2011. They argued in regards to the 12(b)(6) motion that the plaintiff had failed to meet her burden of specific factual allegations sufficent to state a claim, and that each of her causes of action fail independently. In their reply pursuant to the 10(a) motion, defendants argued that plaintiff's arguments did not justify anonymity in this case, while also denying that they had ever "retaliated against [p]laintiff (or anyone else) for complaining regarding its practices." Amazon also claimed that "embarrassment does not meet the strict standards for anonymity." 

On December 23, 2011, the Washington district court judge in Seattle granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on Rule 10(a) grounds.  The court said "the injury [plaintiff] fears is not severe enough to justify permitting her to proceed anonymously. " The judge granted leave to "Jane Doe" to amend her complaint by adding her real name within 14 days of the order. 

On January 6, 2012, "Jane Doe" filed an amended complaint using her real name, Huong Huang.

On March 30, 2012, a federal district court judge ruled on the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. Taking plaintiff's factual allegations as true, the court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion.

1. Breach of Contract. The court held that Huang's breach of contract claim was sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss stage. Plaintiff alleged an existence of a contractual duty and a breach of that duty. The court said the "plain language of the contract does not permit defendants unfettered use of the personal information that Plaintiff provided for the purposes of processing payment."
2. Fraud. In regards to the fraud claim, the court held that Huang's claim failed because it did not meet the high standard of specificity requirements of Rule 9(b). This claim was dismissed with leave to amend with "the requisite standard of particularity."
3. Washington's Privacy Act. Plaintiff's privacy claim also failed because it misapplied the Washington statute. The information was not "private" and was not "intercepted" or "recorded" by defendants, as required by the statute.  This claim was dismissed with prejudice.
4. Washington's Consumer Protection Act. The Consumer Protection Act claim was also allowed to survive at the motion to dismiss stage. The court found that "defendants' alleged practices" could affect millions of people if plaintiff's allegations of IMDb.com's unfair and deceptive practices are true. 

On April 25, 2012, Huang filed a Second Amended Complaint (SAC), addressing the specificity in her fraud claim. In her SAC, Huang argues that defendants were engaged in data-mining, and that they "materially misrepresent...the safety, security and purposes for which they gather and use the personal and credit card information of consumers who subscribe to IMDbPro." She claims she would not have shared her credit card information if she knew the defendants would use "such information for other purposes." (The plaintiff and defendants disagree as to which documents represent the operative agreements in this matter.) Huang also adds a new claim about Amazon.com. She alleges that she purchased products from Amazon.com prior to subscribing to IMDbPro and  that "Amazon.com misrepresented in the Privacy agreement available on its website the terms on which Amazon.com would share her user information with IMDb.com."

After Huang filed her second amended complaint, defendants filed another Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b) on May 9, 2012. In it, defendants argue that plaintiff's new claim about Amazon.com's Privacy Notice is a "thinly veiled attempt to keep Amazon.com in this lawsuit." Defendants also argue that plaintiff's SAC "comingles" defendants and fails to distinguish between Amazon.com and IMDb.com, as required for a state claim for fraud. They claim that plaintiff still does not specify "which statements are false, which statements IMDB.com knew were false and intended plaintiff to rely on, and which statements she had a right to rely on."  

Huang filed an opposition to the Motion on May 21, 2012, and defendants replied to the opposition on May 25, 2012.

On June 1, 2012, Huang filed a Motion for Relief from Trial Deadlines and to Continue Trial Dealines alleging defendants did not file substantial answers to her complaint and/or raise substantial defenses. The plaintiff also claims both parties have been "embroiled" in discovery disputes because Amazon claims to be exempt from full discovery. Defendants filed an Opposition to that motion on June 13, 2012, alleging that plaintiff was delaying her own responses to discovery and had failed to respond to efforts to negotiate a "mutally acceptable protective order." On June 15, 2012, Huang filed a Reply in support of her Motion for Relief from Trial Deadlines and to Continue Trial Date.  

The plaintiff and defendants asked the Court to enter a Stipulated Protective Order regarding discovery on June 28, 2012.