On July 2, 2012, Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., a Virginia rug cleaning company, filed a complaint for defamation and conspiracy to defame against seven anonymous Yelp reviewers in the Circuit Court for the City of Alexandria.

Hadeed claimed these users' reviews were false and defamatory because it "had no record that the negative reviewers were ever Hadeed Carpet customers." Additionally, Hadeed noted that many of the negative reviews contained similar "themes" (for example, that Hadeed had doubled the price) and that one of the reviewers was from an area where Hadeed does not do business. Based on this evidence, Hadeed alleged that the authors of the negative reviews "acted together for the purpose of willfully and maliciously injuring Hadeed Carpet's reputation." Hadeed requested $1.1 million in punitive and compensatory damages, attorney's fees and costs, and a permanent injunction.

On July 3, 2012, Hadeed issued a subpoena duces tecum to Yelp seeking information identifying the anonymous commenters.

Yelp responded with a written objection to the subpoena on July 19, 2012. It contended: (1) that Hadeed had not complied with Virginia's procedure for subpoenas to identify anonymous Internet users, Code § 8.01-407.1, because it did not list the allegedly defamatory comments with adequate specificity; (2) that the First Amendment prevented disclosure of the defendants' identities because Hadeed had failed to present a prima facie case that their speech was defamatory; and (3) that the subpoena could not be enforced against a foreign non-party company.

On July 30, 2012, Hadeed filed a renewed subpoena that complied with the procedural requirements of Code § 8.01-407.1 by attaching documents allegedly establishing the basis for Hadeed's belief that the challenged posts were actionable. In its accompanying Notice of Filing Supporting Material, Hadeed asserted that "determining whether or not Defendants were customers of Hadeed is centrally necessary for Hadeed to advance any defamation claim."

Yelp filed written objections to the renewed subpoena on September 5, 2012. Yelp again asserted that Hadeed had failed to meet the appropriate legal test for obtaining identifying information about anonymous speakers because it had not "produce[d] evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie case" of defamation. Yelp noted that numerous appellate courts, most notably in Dendrite v. Doe and Doe v. Cahill, had held that that this was the proper test under the First Amendment, and argued that to the extent that Virginia had set a more permissive standard than Dendrite, Virginia should "join the national consensus standard on this issue." Yelp also asserted that it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Virginia because it had no property there, and because Hadeed had consented to exclusive jurisdiction in California by agreeing to Yelp's terms of service when it chose to advertise on Yelp. Finally, Yelp argued that the subpoena was overbroad because Hadeed sought all documents Yelp possessed for the users that "relate[d] in any way" to Hadeed, which could encompass private communications subject to other legal protections or not reasonably accessible to Yelp.

On September 26, 2012, Hadeed moved to overrule the objections and enforce the subpoena. Hadeed argued that the proper legal standard for obtaining information about Yelp's anonymous users came from Virginia Code § 8.01-407.1 and was satisfied by its good faith claim that "it reviewed its own detailed customer files and c[ould] find no evidence that these specific seven persons were ever Hadeed customers." Hadeed also claimed that its attempts to obtain those identities through publicly available information or through discussions with Yelp had been unsuccessful. Hadeed also maintained that it had properly subpoenaed Yelp's records by serving the subpoena on Yelp's registered agent for service of process in Virginia, and argued that "Yelp conducts business over the internet in Virginia, and is present in Virginia through its registered agent." Further, Hadeed argued, it had not waived jurisdiction in Virgina, claiming that Yelp's terms of service only pertained to disputes arising out of the advertising relationship. Finally, Hadeed argued that the subpoena was not overbroad, as it only requested "postings" relating to Hadeed, not "communications," and Yelp's objection that the subpoena might encompass private communications was therefore unfounded.

On October 22, 2012, Yelp filed a memo in support of its objections to the subpoena and opposing Hadeed's motion to compel discovery. Yelp reiterated that the First Amendment "provides special protections for anonymity on the Internet," and argued that the court should apply the Dendrite test. The subpoena could not be enforced under this test, Yelp argued, because Hadeed had "failed to produce any evidence that any of the statements made about it are false." Yelp also continued to assert that it was not subject to jurisdiction. It argued that "predicating personal jurisdiction on the mere fact that Yelp enables its users to make statements accessible in Virginia through the Internet offends traditional principles of state sovereignty."

Hadeed responded to Yelp's objections on Oct. 31, 2012, reiterating its previous arguments.

The trial court held oral arguments on November 14, 2012, and enforced the subpoena on November 19, 2012. According to the court, it had jurisdiction over the motion based on service of the subpoena on Yelp's registered agent. The court added, however, that "even if a registered agent alone was an insufficient basis for jurisdiction," the court had jurisdiction "in light of Yelp's conduct directing electronic activity in Virginia and business relationships with Virginia companies and residents." The advertising agreement between the parties, the court held, did not deprive the court of jurisdiction, because the motion to compel was not a dispute between Hadeed and Yelp but rather a dispute between Hadeed and the anonymous reviewers, parties not governed by the agreement.

Finally, the trial court held that the proper standard for compelling the identity of anonymous speakers was laid out in Virginia Code § 8.01-407.1, which requires a showing that the statements "may be tortious" and that the speaker's identity is "important" or "relates to a core claim." Hadeed had met the statutory standard, the court held, because "the statements [we]re tortious if not made by customers" and "the identity of the communicators [w]as essential to maintain a suit for defamation." The court found no constitutional problem with this result. Although the court "recognize[d] that anonymous speech and even false speech is entitled to protection under the First Amendment," it stated that such speech is "not entitled to the same level of protection as truthful or political speech." Without citing Dendrite or Cahill, the court therefore ordered Yelp to produce information identifying the anonymous speakers.

Yelp refused to enforce the subpoena and, on January 9, 2013, the court held Yelp in contempt and imposed a $500 fine and $1000 in attorney fees. The sanctions were stayed pending appeal.

Yelp appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia and filed its opening brief on May 7, 2013. Yelp argued that the circuit court violated the First Amendment by ordering Yelp to identify the defendants, because Hadeed should have been required to do more than articulate a good faith belief that the speech "may be tortious." Indeed, Yelp asserted, the constitution requires "a factual showing, . . . that the statements are actionable and that there is an evidentiary basis for the prima facie elements of the claim." Yelp also argued that the court erred in concluding that the speech at issue did not warrant First Amendment protection because it was defamatory, because that argument begged the question by relying on the defamatory nature of the speech to compel evidence to prove its defamatory nature. Yelp also pointed to the constitutional requirement of proof of fault in defamation cases.

Yelp next argued that, even if Hadeed had made a sufficient showing that the reviewers were not Hadeed customers, the statements were not actionable. The parts of the reviews that Hadeed alleged were false -- the identities of the reviewers -- were not the parts of the reviews that could negatively impact Hadeed's reputation. Under Fourth Circuit precedent, Yelp claimed, "the falsity of a statement and the defamatory ‘sting' of the publication must coincide" for a statement to constitute defamation. And in this case, "Hadeed never allege[d] that the substantive problems set forth in the reviews, such as charging twice the advertised price, [we]re themselves false." Additionally, Yelp argued that Hadeed was libel-proof and could not sue for defamation because, in light of the large number of negative Yelp reviews of Hadeed that were not included in the lawsuit, a few more negative comments "would [not] cause Hadeed any incremental harm."

Yelp finally argued that, if the statements could be actionable, Hadeed had not presented a sufficient factual basis for the subpoena. When a party is "seeking discovery of information protected by the First Amendment," Yelp claimed, it should be required to show that "there is reason to believe that the information sought will, in fact, help its case." Hadeed had failed to make this showing, Yelp stated.

On May 8, 2013, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the American Society of News Editors, Gannett Co., and The Washington Post filed a brief in support of Yelp. They argued that: the court should recognize "a heightened standard for compelled disclosure of identities" consistent with a consensus that has developed in the courts; allowing plaintiffs to compel the identity of authors "of any speech that ‘may be tortious' simply based on an unsupported allegation is inconsistent with the First Amendment"; and a "heightened standard is important to news organizations and other Internet publishers in creating a meaningful exchange of ideas on their web sites."

Hadeed filed its appellee's brief on May 30, 2013, arguing that the Virginia statute "clearly meets the minimal constitutional protections required under the First Amendment." But even if the Dendrite test were constitutionally required, Hadeed contended that the test had been satisfied because its complaint had "provided the actual statements, and if the posters are not customers, their statements are defamatory per se." Even under Dendrite, Hadeed argued, it was not required to present "all evidence necessary to survive a tough cross examination, summary judgment, or even . . . a jury verdict." Hadeed claimed it could not present more detailed information rebutting the Yelp reviews because it "serves 35,000 customers per year and its staff encounters all variety of circumstances," and the experiences of its thousands of other customers would not be relevant to "whether one specific person was defrauded through a bait and switch." Hadeed also contested Yelp's argument that it was libel proof, arguing that the many other negative Yelp reviews were not reliable.

Yelp filed a reply brief on June 27, 2013. It asserted that "even apart from the fact that a state statute cannot overrule the requirements of the First Amendment, there is no inconsistency between section 8.01-407.1 and the Dendrite-Cahill line of cases." Under the statute, Yelp claimed, it "is not enough for the plaintiff to show good faith; it must have a ‘legitimate' basis for claiming that the speech was tortious." Yelp argued that Hadeed had "alleged defamation, but ha[d] of yet proved nothing," and pointed out that Hadeed had not filed an affidavit from any employee actually denying that Hadeed engaged in the misconduct alleged in the Yelp reviews.

The Court of Appeals of Virginia, by a vote of two to one, affirmed the trial court's decision on January 7, 2014.

First, the court stated that although anonymous speech is protected by the First Amendment, "defamatory speech is not entitled to constitutional protection." Therefore, the court stated, "if the reviews are unlawful in that they are defamatory, then the [reviewers'] veil of anonymity may be pierced." Further, the court found that the speech at issue was commercial speech, as it was "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience." Because courts have recognized a lower level of First Amendment protection for commercial speech," the court held that the anonymous reviewers' "right to anonymity is subject to a substantial governmental interest in disclosure." In contrast, the court stated, a "business's reputation is a precious commodity."

The court also rejected the argument that the reviews were non-actionable opinion. "Generally," the court stated, "a Yelp review is entitled to First Amendment protection because it is a person's opinion." However, the court explained, this protection "relies upon an underlying assumption of fact: that the reviewer was a customer of the specific company and he posted his review based on his personal experience with the business. If this underlying assumption of fact proves false, . . . then the review is not an opinion; instead, the review is based on a false statement of fact."

The court next turned to Virginia law. It held that Virginia Code § 8.01-407.1 provided the proper test for uncovering the identity of an anonymous Internet communicator. The court noted that it was "reluctant to declare legislative acts unconstitutional" and ultimately refused to do so, because there was no constitutional infirmity that was "clear, palpable, and practically free from doubt." The court also refused to "adopt persuasive authority from other states," including Dendrite and Cahill, noting that the Virginia legislature had considered that authority and ultimately made its own policy decisions.

In applying the Virginia statute, the court held that Hadeed presented sufficient evidence to show that the reviews were or may have been defamatory by "indicating that it made a thorough review of its customer database" and could not match the defendants' reviews with customers. Further, the court believed that Hadeed acted on a "legitimate, good faith belief that the Doe defendants were not former customers," and "took reasonable efforts to identify the anonymous communicators." Finally, according to the court, the reviewers' identities were "not only important," but "necessary" because "without the identity of the Doe defendants, Hadeed cannot move forward with its defamation lawsuit."

The court also concluded that the trial court properly exercised subpoena jurisdiction over Yelp because Virginia statutes "explicitly allow for service on a registered agent of a foreign corporation that is authorized to do business in the Commonwealth."

Senior Judge James Haley dissented. Judge Haley agreed that Virginia Code § 8.01-407 provided the proper framework for analysis, and stated that correct analysis under the statutory framework properly "balances the First Amendment protection of an anonymous speaker and the right of redress for defamation." However, he concluded that, in this case, "the balance envisioned by [the statute] should weigh for the protection afforded by" the U.S. and Virginia constitutions. Judge Haley noted that Hadeed had not "claimed that any of the substantive statements [we]re false," and, at oral argument, "candidly admitted that it [could] not say the John Doe defendants are not customers." By arguing that the reviewers "may not have been customers, and, if they were not, the substantive statements may be tortious," Hadeed failed to provide sufficient supporting material to justify the subpoena, he asserted. Instead, Judge Haley said, Hadeed's claim was merely "a self-serving argument -- one that proceed[ed] from a premise the argument [wa]s supposed to prove."

According to the complaint, Zack Anderson, RJ Ryan, and Alessandro Chiesa were undergraduate students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The students claimed to have discovered a vulnerability in the "CharlieCard" and "CharlieTicket" automated fare collection systems used by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) for Boston area public transit. The students planned to share their research at the DEFCON computer security conference on August 10, 2008. Their description of the presentation, as quoted in the complaint, was as follows:

Want free subway rides for life? In this talk we go over weaknesses in common subway fare collection systems. We focus on the Boston T subway, and show how we reverse engineered the data on magstripe card [sic], we present several attacks to completely break the CharlieCard, a MIFARE Classic smartcard used in many subway systems around the world, and we discuss physical security problems. We will discuss practical brute force attacks using FPGAs and how to use software-radio to read RFID cards. We go over social engineering attacks we executed on employees, and we present a novel new method of hacking WiFi: WARCARTING. We will release several open source tools we wrote to perform these attacks. With live demos, we will demonstrate how we broke these systems.

When the MBTA learned of their planned presentation, they arranged a meeting with the MIT students and MIT Professor Ronald Rivest, who specializes in network security. According to the court records, the students met with the MBTA on August 5, but refused to provide the MBTA with materials they planned to present, and instead agreed to provide a three-page summary of the vulnerabilities they found. The students also modified their event description to remove the reference to "free subway rides for life," and made other small alterations to the event description.

On August 8, 2008 the MBTA filed a complaint and motion for a temporary restraining order against the students and MIT. The complaint alleged that the students committed a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) by transmitting information that caused damage to computers. The complaint also alleged that the students committed the common law torts of conversion and trespass to chattels by intercepting MBTA rider fares, that MIT negligently supervised the students by failing to instruct the students to "responsibly disclose information concerning perceived security flaws," and that all four defendants committed a violation of Massachusetts's unfair and deceptive trade practices statute, M.G.L. Ch. 93A § 11.

The complaint sought an order preventing the students from "offering to provide software tools or demonstrations to allow others to duplicate the attacks referenced," from "providing information or materials that would assist another in any material way to circumvent the security of the" CharlieCard system, from "publicly stating or indicating that the security or integrity" of the system "has been compromised," from "further circulating" the conference panel announcement, from suggesting that "MIT endorses or approves of the activities" described, and from "declining to provide the MBTA and its vendors with information sufficient to replicate, test, and repair the purported security flaws."

On Saturday, August 9, 2008, U.S. District Court Judge Douglas Woodlock (acting as duty judge covering court matters over the weekend) issued a temporary restraining order forbidding the students from "providing program, information, software code, or command that would assist another in a material way to circumvent or otherwise attack the security of" the MBTA fare system. Per the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in effect at that time, the injunction was scheduled to last for ten days. At oral argument, Judge Woodlock stated that the planned DEFCON presentation would constitute"transmission" of a program, and that the possible harm to MBTA fare collection constituted "damage," for CFAA purposes. The court also indicated that if someone were to use this information to evade fare collection the students would be aiders and abettors of that crime.

The court noted a possible First Amendment issue with the order, but stated "there's a balance that has to be drawn at various points," and that "we can't expect people in their early 20s to have sufficient judgment or experience to avoid causing those clashes of interest between something as broad and as important as the First Amendment and the need to avoid actual criminal conduct of which words are the constituent elements." The students argued that they had met with the MBTA and provided a report addressing their discovered vulnerabilities and what they planned to present at DEFCON, but the court found that insufficient to remove the risk of irreparable harm.

On August 11, the MBTA filed a motion to modify the terms of the restraining order, to clarify that the injunction only applies to "non-public" information related to the fare collection system. On August 12, the students responded, opposing the modification of the order and moving to have the court reconsider the restraining order altogether. The students argued that the order was an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, as it prohibited the students' speech without a showing of an intent to induce any unlawful activity, or any other state interest of the highest order. The students further argued that the MBTA failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their CFAA claim, as the legislative history and statutory interpretation of the relevant section of the CFAA suggested that it applied only when a person actually transmits code to a protected computer, and not one's mere description of vulnerabilities. The students also noted that the MBTA's disclosure of the students' presentation slides in a public filing in the current action undermined their claim that an injunction was necessary.

On August 14, 2008, the MBTA responded to the students' motion. The MBTA argued that while some of the material related to their fare system was now public in light of the disclosure of the DEFCON slides, there remained non-public information that the students might share, including the source code of the program they used to read and alter the fare cards. The MBTA further argued that the CFAA's language extends to transmitting damaging "information," and not just software, and that the students' planned speech would advocate violation of the law, and would thus be unprotected by the First Amendment under Brandenburg v. Ohio. Finally, the MBTA argued that the presentation was not "research," but was instead commercial speech, and that the students failed to follow industry standards for responsible disclosure of a data breach. 

In a reply filed on August 18, the students argued that the factual record contradicted the claim that the students planned to share anything beyond what was already in the public docket of this court case. The students further argued that the MBTA failed the basic standard for injunctive relief as there was no immediate risk of harm. They also argued that adherence to industry standards for responsible disclosure was not required by law and, if compelled, would lead to censorship of important public information. (To support this, the students also provided a letter from eleven computer science professors and computer scientists discussing responsible disclosure.) The reply also argued that the students were discussing matters of policy and not engaging in commercial speech, as evidenced by the use of the student's research in numerous news articles addressing the data security of the CharlieCard system.

On August 14, Judge George O'Toole, the assigned judge for the case, held a hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order should remain in effect for the full ten days that it was issued.  Judge O'Toole allowed the restraining order to remain in place, and granted the MBTA's motion for limited discovery against the students in preparation of the MBTA's motion to convert the restraining order into a preliminary injunction. The court allowed the MBTA to obtain: written correspondence, as well as "permissions, waivers, and other agreements" between the students and the DEFCON organizers; a copy of a MIT class paper that the students wrote, which served the basis of the presentation; copies of all software tools the students intended to distribute as part of the DEFCON presentation; and copies of any other materials the students planned to distribute.

On August 17, 2008, the students filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's discovery order as it applied to the the class paper and planned presentation software and materials. The students argued that such material is exempt from disclosure under the First Circuit's decision in Cusumano v. Microsoft, which protects certain academic sources and work product from disclosure. The students argued that the MBTA, a governmental agency, was seeking impermissible pre-publication review of academic work product.

On August 18, the MBTA filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. In its supporting memorandum, in addition to the arguments made previously, the MBTA argued that there remained information that the students had yet to disclose to the MBTA and the court about their planned presentation, including the software they planned to share. The MBTA also included a declaration from Systems Project Manager Scott Henderson, who stated that some of the cards used in the presentation had been used on the MBTA system illegally, based on the MBTA's own audit. The MBTA sought an injunction against the dissemination of this information for five months, in order to give them time to implement security upgrades to the system.

At a hearing on August 19, 2008 the court denied the preliminary injunction and dissolved the temporary restraining order. The court found that the MBTA had failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their CFAA claim, indicating that discussion of security topics is not likely to be not be "transmission" of code, commands, or information under the CFAA, as the statute's terms suggest that such transmission would need to be technical instead of informational in order for the statute to apply. The court also raised doubts as to whether the required $5000 of loss under the CFAA had be sufficiently demonstrated, finding the possible loss of future MBTA revenue as "a matter of possibility but [not] sufficiently established to support the injunction requested." The court noted that it was "mak[ing] that point in the first instance without reference to the First Amendment, what it may or may not guarantee under these circumstances," but also noted the valid public interest in such disclosures and discussions.

On October 7, 2008, the MBTA and student defendants filed a stipulation of dismissal, dismissing the claims against the students with prejudice and without costs. On December 22, 2008 the Electronic Frontier Foundation released a statement indicating that the MBTA and MIT students are now working together to improve the data security of the MBTA system. The claims against MIT were dismissed on February 3, 2009.

James Rosen is a national news journalist for the Fox News Channel. On June 11, 2009, Rosen published an article on www.foxnews.com entitled "North Korea Intends to Match U.N. Resolution with New Nuclear Test." His Gmail email account is referenced in the case's court documents as "Redacted@gmail.com."

On May 28, 2010, Reginald B. Reyes, a Special Agent for the FBI filed an application for a search warrant for James Rosen's Gmail account, which was maintained by servers located at Google's headquarters in California. The search warrant application stated that the emails concealed information which, under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c), contained: (1) evidence of a crime; (2) contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed; and (3) property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime. The warrant application stated that the search was related to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 793, which governs the "gathering, transmitting or losing defense information."

The search warrant application included an affidavit by Agent Reyes in support of the search warrant. Reyes' affidavit said the warrant was pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa and permissible as the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has jurisdiction over the offense under investigation. Reyes states that he believes there is probable cause that Rosen violated Section 793(d) as an aider and abettor and/or co-conspirator to Stephen Kim.

That same day, a search and seizure warrant was issued by a U.S. Magistrate Judge to be executed on or before June 11, 2010. The warrant granted the search of electronic e-mails and other electronic data of Rosen's account, and permitted the officer executing the warrant to delay notice to Rosen for 30 days under 18 U.S.C. § 2705. An attachment to the issued warrant stated that Google, Inc. was not permitted to notify "any other person, including the subscriber(s) of Redacted@gmail.com" of the warrant's existence. Google, Inc. was required to make exact duplicates of all information from the email account and send this information to Agent Reyes in overnight mail or facsimile. The attachment asked for any commuications between Rosen's account and 3 other accounts, including anothe Gmail account and two Yahoo! mail accounts; the usernames of all three accounts are also redacted in the public record. The warrant attachment referenced Rosen's connection to Stephen Kim, who was under investigation by the FBI for allegedly telling a reporter that North Korea may test a nuclear bomb.

On May 21, 2013, the government filed a motion to unseal entire docket of Rosen's case, including the application for the search warrant, the attachment to the warrant, Reyes' affidavit, and the granted warrant, with only names and dates of birth redacted for privacy reasons. 

On May 22, 2013, the court granted the government's motion in a memo and order that directed the case to be a matter of public record. The memo detailed clerical errors which stalled the placement of the redacted warrant and related materials into public record. The memo apologized for the administrative errors and instituted the inclusion of a new tab on the Court's website solely for the publication of search warrants. Executed warrants will be part of the public record unless a "separate sealing order is entered to redact all or portions" upon a showing by the government as required by United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1980) and Washington Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

In a separate order that same day, the court ordered that the Clerk place on the public docket a redacted version of the government's motion to unseal entire docket and that the government produce unredacted versions of all unsealed material to the defense in United States v. Stephen Jin-Woo Kim.

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This case arose from the judicial transfer of the copyright in a report entitled "Complaint Review: Richard A. Goren" ("the Report") that was posted on consumer reporting website Ripoff Report on January 31, 2012. The copyright transfer was ordered by a justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court in Goren v. Doe.

On July 16, 2013, Goren and Small Justice LLC, a separate entity alleged to have an interest in the copyright of the Report, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Xcentric Ventures, the owner and operator of Ripoff Report, for copyright infringement. The complaint claimed that after the state court transferred copyright ownership to Goren on May 8, 2013, he served Xcentric Ventures on May 14, 2013, with a demand that the defendant cease infringing on his copyright and remove the Report. The complaint alleged that Goren made the same demand on June 25, 2013, and that on June 27, 2013, Ripoff Report -- which has a strict no-removal policy -- notified Goren of its refusal to remove the Report.

The complaint stated that per a preliminary injunction issued by the state court, Google acquiesced to Goren's request to remove the URLs containing the content specified in the injunction, which appeared in response to searches for "Richard Goren attorney" and "Richard Goren fraud." The plaintiffs alleged that after the removal, however, the Report was re-indexed with different dates from the original and appeared again on a Google search. They alleged that these acts of infringement were willful and intentional and that, unless enjoined, the conduct would continue to cause both plaintiffs "great and irreparable injury that [could not] fully be compensated or measured in money." The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, statutory and actual damages, and attorney's fees, as well as a jury trial.

Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint on  September 2, 2013, adding "Christian DuPont dba Arabianights-Boston Massachusetts" - alleged to be the creator of the original Ripoff Report entry at issue - as a plaintiff. The new complaint also added three new claims against Xcentric: libel, tortious interference, and unfair and deceptive acts under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 93A. The last claim involved allegations that Xcentric operated a scheme where they refused to remove damaging content while offering those affected an opportunity to pay for "arbitration services" to restore their reputations.

Xcentric moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint on  September 16, 2013, arguing among other things that: (1) the new claims were barred by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act because they were based on content created by a third party; and (2) Goren lacked any ownership of the copyrights because  Xcentric owned those copyrights itself under the original author's earlier agreement to the Ripoff Report terms of service, and/or because the state court judge's purported transfer of copyrights to Goren was invalid under the Copyright Act as an involuntary transfer.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that Section 230 did not apply to Xcentric's content because Xcentric claimed to own the content at issue and affirmatively promoted it.  It further argued that Xcentric's arbitration scheme for damaging content was separately actionable as an unfair trade practice. With respect to copyright standing, the plaintiffs claimed that the alleged transfer of rights to Xcentric was invalid as a matter of contract, and that the transfer of rights by the state court judge was the result of the original author's voluntary decision not to defend against the state court action.  The plaintiffs further sought partial judgment on the pleadings that Xcentric was not protected by Section 230 and could not prove that it had received a transfer of the copyrights at issue.

On March 24, 2014, the district court ruled on the pending motions, as follows: (1) granting the motion to dismiss (and denying plaintiffs' motion) as to the libel, tortious interference, and Chapter 93A claims to the extent they were based on publication of third-party content, finding that these claims were barred by Section 230 regardless of whether Xcentric owned or promoted the content; (2) denying the motion to dismiss as to the Chapter 93A claim to the extent that it was premised on the offering of arbitration services; and (3) denying both Xcentric's motion to dismiss and plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the copyright issues, finding that the state of copyright ownership could not be determined on the current state of the record. The court did not reach the question of the validity of the state court's purported transfer of the copyright to Goren.

The plaintiff, an 18-year old who aspires to be a rapper, posted lyrics on his Facebook page referencing the Boston Marathon bombings two weeks after the bombings occurred. D'Ambrosio also posted that the White House was a "federal house of horror." While his Facebook page has since been removed, in one line of the rap, D'Ambrosio wrote, "everyone you will see what I am going to do, kill people." D'Ambrosio also recorded a Youtube video and sent text messages that referenced the content of this rap.

On May 1, 2013, D'Ambrosio did not attend school, and at least one student, who had seen the Facebook post, notified school officials, who then notified police. D'Ambrosio was arrested one week after the Facebook post and charged with Communicating a Terrorist Threat under Mass. Gen. Laws c. 269, section 14, a felony charge that can bring up to 20 years in prison. According to Chief Solomon of the Methuen Police Department, D'Ambrosio did not make threats against particular individuals or the school in his rap. Judge Lynn Rooney of Lawrence District Court originally set D'Ambrosio's bail at $1,000,000 but this was subsequently revoked, and D'Ambrosio was held without bail.

On May 2, 2013, D'Ambrosio was arraigned in Lawrence District Court and, represented by his attorney Geoffrey DuBosque, plead not guilty on charges of making a bomb threat.

After D'Ambrosio's arrest, Fight for the Future and the Center for Rights posted a petition on their website entitled "Free Cameron D'Ambrosio!" The website detailed D'Ambrosio's arrest and argued for protection of D'Ambrosio's First Amendment privileges and freedom of speech on the internet. The petition received over 90,000 signatures.

On June 6, 2013, a grand jury refused to indict D'Ambrosio on a charge of making terrorist threats and Judge Rooney ordered that he be released on personal recognizance. On June 27, 2013, the charges against D'Ambrosio were officially dropped.