Miguel Rodriguez is a U.S. Navy veteran, who attended Widener University under the G.I. Bill as a student in the Biology Pre-Med Program, and worked as a tutor and Advisor and Operations Manager at the University. In a complaint filed March 13, 2013 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Rodriguez brought eight causes of action against Widener University, the City of Chester, David Coughlin, Denise Gifford, Patrick Sullivan, and Matthew Donohue, claiming civil rights and privacy violations arising out of events that  transpired after Defendant Sullivan, Widener's Director of Campus Safety, allegedly gained access to and printed images from Rodriguez's Facebook account without authorization on March 16, 2011.

According to the complaint, as a result of the unauthorized access Widener University and Chester Police Officer Matthew Donohue brought Rodriguez in for interrogation and temporarily suspended him. According to Sullivan, he was suspended because "he was perceived to be a threat to the community and . . . displayed weapons on Facebook." At the end of this interrogation, Rodriguez was involuntarily sent to Crozer Chester Medical Center for one week, during which Rodriguez was forced to miss a medical school admissions interview. When he was cleared by the Medical Center, the suspension was continued due to a small amount of marijuana and a knife found when the Chester police searched his book bag during the investigation process. The University then made readmission contingent upon a positive assessment by Dr. Beth Howlett in Widener's Office of Disabilities Services. During this time, David Coughlin, Rodriguez's advisor, allegedly made false statements to the campus and Chester police about Rodriguez, claiming he was restricted from campus and had been making threatening calls. On March 25, 2011, Rodriguez was expelled from Widener University and his employment with the University was terminated.

Rodriguez claimed the Defendants violated the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the unwarranted dismissal and termination, as well as interrogation and involuntary admission to the hospital, violated his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendment. This claim was accompanied by a § 1985 claim for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. Rodriguez similarly claimed a violation of his equal protection rights, asserting that the Defendants discriminated against him based upon his disability, race, and/or status as a  "class of one;" and that the Defendants violated the Rehabilitation Act by dismissing Rodriguez as a student and terminating his employment rather than providing accommodations for his mental disability. The complaint also asserted several privacy-related claims, including an invasion of privacy under the Fourth Amendment when the Defendants accessed information on Rodriguez's Facebook page and obtained medical information from the hospitals he was admitted to without his consent. Rodriguez also argued that accessing his emails and Facebook page and using the photos found therein without his authorization constituted a violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Stored Communications Act. Lastly, under Pennsylvania's common law, Rodriguez argued that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his Facebook account, which was violated by the Defendants' unauthorized access of the account.

In response, the Widener Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on April 4, 2013. First, the Widener defendants argued that they are not state actors for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 or under the U.S. Constitution, and that therefore the Civil Rights Act, equal protection, and Fourth Amendment-based privacy claims should be dismissed. The Defendants also maintained that Rodriguez could not pursue a cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act as he had never disclosed the disability to the University or sought accommodation for the disability prior to his suspension. Lastly, as Rodriguez's Facebook posts were accessible to the public generally and/or forwarded to the Defendants by concerned students who had been permitted access to his Facebook page, the Defendants moved to dismiss the ECPA and SCA claims, as well as the Pennsylvania privacy claim, as these all rely on improper access.  

On April 25, Rodriguez opposed this motion. First he argued that despite being private parties, the Widener Defendants are state actors, as they "willfully participated in a joint conspiracy with state officials to deprive a person of a constitutional right acts ‘under color of state law'" by bringing in the Chester police. He also alleges that the Defendants were aware of his mental disability, made particularly clear during the interrogation, and perceived Rodriguez as disabled, sufficient to sustain a claim under the Rehabilitation Act. As to those claims that rely on unauthorized access to Rodriguez's Facebook account, Rodriguez reasserted that he did not post them publically, though it remains to be determined how the Defendants obtained the images.  

The District Court granted in part and denied in part the Widener Defendants' motion to dismiss in an order on June 17, 2013. The Court dismissed Rodriguez's first four claims, which relied on finding the Widener Defendants to be state actors. The Court concluded that Rodriguez failed to plausibly allege state action, such that the Civil Rights Act and Fourth Amendment claims could not be properly sustained. In addition, the Rehabilitation Act count was dismissed, as the Court held that Rodriguez failed to establish that Widener University should have been aware that he was entitled to any accommodations or that he ever requested such accomdations. Discussing the ECPA and SCA claims together, the Court concluded that to the extent that these statutory claims were based on improper access to Rodriguez's Facebook images, the claims may proceed. Judge Padova's opinion noted that there was no factual basis for the Defendants' assertion that Rodriguez's Facebook images were generally available to the public, whereas the emails in question had been sent by Rodriguez himself to some of the Defendants. With respect to the common law invasion of privacy claim, the Court narrowed the claim down to the two theories of privacy that could possibly be plausible:  publication of private facts and false light. Because Rodriguez failed to allege the elements a privacy claim under either theory, this claim was also dismissed. 

Following the Court's order dismissing most of Rodriguez's claim, on July 2, 2013, the Widener Defendants answered the complaint regarding the surviving SCA and ECPA claims. Their defenses emphasized the public nature of Rodriguez's Facebook postings, arguing that they were generally available to the public, or in alternate, permissbly accessible to third parties who in turn shared the information with the Widener Defendants. 

The City of Chester and Officer Donohue also filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on July 15, 2013. The parties stipulated that of the many claims made by Rodriguez, the only claim against the Chester Defendants was for false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Chester Defendants argued that they did not directly cause a constitutional deprivation and that Rodriguez's complaint made no allegation that his constitutional rights were violated by policies or customs of the municipality of Chester or Officer Donohue as its agent. 

The plaintiff owns the Plainridge Racecourse, a harness horse-racing track in Plainville, Massachusetts. Thomas Keen maintains the website "NoPlainvilleRacino" which opposes the development of a gaming facility in Plainville, Massachusetts.

On April 20, 2012, Ourway Realty d/b/a Plainridge Racecourse sent a cease and desist letter to Keen which cited a photograph Keen had posted on his NoPlainvilleRacino website. The picture showed an individual who was suspected of breaking and entering into a building on the Plainville Racecourse. Underneath the picture, another user left a comment that said, "I wonder if they checked the racetrack, lol." The cease and desist letter alleged that Keen's posting was "objectionable, unprofessional and actionable" and stated that Keen posted the photo to "associate the alleged crime" with Plainville Racecourse. The letter demanded that Keen remove the posting, refrain from posting "similar damaging material" in the future. The letter also demanded that Keen issue an apology on his website, Facebook, and the Sun Chronicle newspaper.

On June 4, 2012, Ourway filed a complaint against Thomas Keen in the Superior Court in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for defamation. The complaint stated that the posting "intimates that criminals are clearly associated with the Plaintiff's present operations," and alleged that because of Keen's posting, Ourway suffered severe economic harm. The plaintiff requested damages, injunctive relief to remove "offensive material" from Keen's website, and an order prohibiting future publication of "information similar in nature."

On July 20, 2012, Keen served a Special Motion to Dismiss on Ourway pursuant to Massachusetts' anti-SLAPP statute, G.L. c. 231, § 59H. Keen's memorandum of law in support of the motion asserted that the comment at issue was removed prior to the commencement of litigation and called the plaintiff's action a "class example" of a SLAPP suit. The memorandum cited Keen's right to petition under Massachusetts' anti-SLAPP statute, saying that Keen's website satisfies at least four of the five forms of right to petition protected under the law:

1. The site contains a "written or oral statement made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding" over whether a "slot parlor would be good for Plainville[,]" an issue that the Plainville Board of Selectmen will negotiate with Ourway under the MA gaming statute.
2. The site is "reasonably likely to enlist public participation" because it encourages "residents to contact selectpersons and ‘tell them a racino is not in Plainville's best interest.'"
3. The site is "reasonably likely to encourage consideration or review of an issue by a legislative, executive, or judicial body or any other governmental proceeding" because the website elicits readers to contact town officials regarding their stance on the racino.
4. The site's stance on racino falls under the final definition of § 59H, "any other statement falling within constitutional protection of the right to petition government" as the website was "intended to organize" a community "around an issue of concern."

The memorandum further argued that Ourway could not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the petition caused the plaintiff actual injury or that Keen's right to petition lacked any "reasonable factual support or arguable basis in law." It cited the "lol" from the user's comment, saying that "statements written ‘not for serious effect' are simply not libelous."

Keen also served an affidavit which discussed his opposition to the casino development and his establishment of the NoPlainvilleRacino website. His affidavit detailed the origin of the photograph, which was taken by a webcam of a burglar who broke into Keen's home; that photo was posted by the Plainville Police Department on its Facebook page. An administrator of the No Plainville Racino Facebook page shared the photo on that page, under which a Facebook user posted the comment in question.

On August 17, 2012, Ourway served Keen with an Opposition to Keen's Special Motion to Dismiss. The memo in opposition said that the anti-SLAPP statute was not meant to protect Keen's conduct, as § 59H is not meant to be an "absolute privilege." The memo in opposition uses the example of an "individual [going] onto any website regarding pending legislation and mak[ing] comments or insinuations unassociated with . . . the site, such as baseless accusations of accusing their opponents of a crime or harboring criminals and then hid[ing] behind the statute" as an example of what the statute was not intended to cover.

On September 12, 2012, Keen served a Reply in Support of Special Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to G.L. c. 231 § 59H, saying that Ourway's memo in opposition differed from the complaint's allegations and that Ourway failed to meet its burden of proof.

Keen's anti-SLAPP motion papers, Ourway's opposition, and Keen's reply were filed with the court on September 17, 2012, pursuant to Superior Court Rule 9A, and was docketed by the court on September 19, 2012

On December 13, 2012, the court allowed Keen's Special Motion to Dismiss, finding that the plaintiff's complaint is based on Keen's "petitioning activities" on his website and that Ourway failed to establish that the "petitioning activities were devoid of factual or legal merit." Keen applied for an award of attorneys' fees, and on April 8, 2013, was awarded $24,776.00 in fees and $136.37 in costs.

Ourway initially appealed the court's ruling, but stipulated to dismissal of its appeal on April 30, 2013.

University Behavioral Health of Denton ("UBH") is a private psychiatric hospital in Texas owned by Ascend Health Corporation, where Brenda Wells, a North Carolina resident, was once treated. Dr. Khan is UBH's medical director, while Dr. Kresch is the President and CEO of Ascend. Wells operates the blog page "Worst Hospitals in America: UBH/Mayhill" at http://ubhdenton.wordpress.com/ (she also owns ubhdentonsucks.com, which redirects to this blog page). Wells promotes this blog, criticizing UBH and its doctors, on social media sites like Facebook and Twitter and encourages readers to submit their own stories. 

On May 3, 2012, Ascend Health Corporation, UBH, and Drs. Khan and Kresch filed a complaint against Brenda Wells in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged five claims for relief: defamation under North Carolina law, violation of the North Carolina Deceptive Trade Practices Act, libel under Texas law, business disparagement under Texas law, copyright infringement, and civil conspiracy. With respect to the North Carolina defamation and Texas libel claims, the plaintiffs referred to statements on the blog in which Wells implied she was held against her will, the doctors were unqualified, the facilities were unsanitary, and more. With respect to the two business-related claims, the plaintiffs argued they suffered reputational harm as a result of the false and defamatory commentary posted on Wells's blog. The plaintiffs also argued that Wells reproduced UBH and Ascend's copyright by taking images of facilities and doctors from their websites and copying the images on her blog. 

In response, Wells filed motions to dismiss on June 15, 2012. First, Wells argued that under North Carolina's choice of law, Texas substantive law rather than North Carolina law should govern this dipute. Wells also argued that the plaintiffs' copyright infringement claim should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) as the plaintiffs failed to prove that they had valid copyrights in the images. Most notably, Wells moved to dismiss the Texas libel and business disparagement claims under the Citizen Participation Act, Texas's anti-SLAPP statute. To support the dismissal of the libel claim, Wells argued that: the allegations in the complaint were not set out with sufficient particularity to satisfy the statute; statements on the blog were non-actionable expressions of opinion and/or were non-defamatory; the blog statements were substantially true; plaintiffs could not prove that Wells acted with the requisite level of fault; the statements are commentary on an issue of public concern; Section 230 immunizes Wells from liability for third-party content on her blog; and the statute of limitations bars claims arising from many of the statements.

The plaintiffs filed an opposition to Wells's motion to dismiss on July 6, 2012. The plaintiffs relied primarily on a choice of law argument, arguing that federal procedural law and North Carolina substantive law govern, which, along with public policy, preclude application of the Texas anti-SLAPP statute. The plaintiffs also argued that Wells is an editor, not an "information service, system, or access software provider," and therefore is not eligible for Section 230 immunity. Further, the plaintiffs argued that the "matter of public concern" privilege does not apply because Wells's blog is not a "publication by a newspaper or other periodical." After arguing that the defamation claims not barred by statute of limitations in Texas or North Carolina, the plaintiffs argued that the complaint's allegations are sufficient to support a case for defamation per se. The plaintiffs also noted the completion of copyright registration to sustain the copyright infringement claims.

On July 23, 2012, Wells replied, reaffirming her argument that Texas's law and anti-SLAPP statute are applicable to this case. Wells also reasserted that plaintiffs failed to meet the burden of proof under the anti-SLAPP statute, and therefore their claims should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

The court granted in part and denied in part the motions to dismiss in an order on March 14, 2013. The court dismissed both North Carolina claims after finding that Texas substantive law governs under North Carolina's choice of law doctrine. The court also dismissed the civil conspiracy claim and copyright infringement claim, finding that Wells's use of the images for criticism was transformative, noncommercial and constituted fair use. The court denied the motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for Texas libel and business disparagement, rejecting the applicability of Section 230. As Wells herself posted to the blog and significantly altered some content that originated with third parties, the court held that Section 230 immunity did not cover her content. Wells's fair reporting privilege argument was also rejected; the court held that as a blogger Wells would not be entitled to the privilege, distinguishing blogs from newspapers and other traditional news sources. In Judge Britt's words, "Postings on the blog are not published at regular intervals. They are not composed of articles, news items, or the like."  

On April 22, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal with prejudice, thereby dismissing all remaining claims against Wells. As of July 2013, Wells's blog and critical commentary remained available.

On May 6, 2013, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie signed P.L. 2013, c.51 § 12 (Bill A3352) into law, which was to be codified as N.J.S.A. § 2C:13-1O and take effect July 1, 2013. The New Jersey law would criminalize "advertising commercial sexual abuse of a minor," which a person commits if he "knowingly publishes, disseminates, or displays, or causes directly or indirectly, to be published, disseminated, or displayed, any advertisement for a commercial sex act, which is to take place in this State and which includes the depiction of a minor" or "knowingly purchases advertising in this State for a commercial sex act which includes the depiction of a minor." The bill requires a minimum fine of $25,000 for a person convicted of this crime.

On June 26, 2013, Backpage.com, a classified advertising website with a section for adult ads, filed suit in the federal district court of the District of New Jersey against New Jersey Attorney General John Hoffman and prosecutors from each of the state's 21 counties. In the complaint, Backpage.com -- pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 -- sought a temporary restraining order to enjoin the enforcement of the law, asserting that it violated Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Commerce Clause.

Specifically, Backpage.com asserted that:

• Bill A3352 was preempted by and violated Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, under which Backpage.com was considered an "interactive computer service."
• The bill was unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it was a content-based restriction that was overbroad and vague.
• The bill was also invalid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because "it purport[ed] to impose strict criminal liability on online service providers such as Backpage.com and others for third-party content, in the absence of proof of scienter, particularly concerning knowledge of the age of any individual depicted in such content."
• The bill violated the Commerce Clause because it attempted to regulate commercial transactions that took place wholly outside of New Jersey. 

In the complaint, Backpage.com sought declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunctions against enforcing the law, and attorney's fees.

On June 28, 2013, Hoffman, on behalf of himself and the other defendants, filed a response to the demand for a temporary restraining or that argued Backpage.com's claims could not satisfy the necessary elements for granting such an order. The defendants claimed that the New Jersey provision did not conflict with Section 230, allowing the two to coexist. They argued that because the challenged statute prohibits the advertisement of an illegal transaction -- commercial sex acts with minors -- it was categorically excluded from First Amendment protection. Further, they claimed that the provision was not overbroad because it did not broadly prohibit references to sex, but rather was directed solely at offers to engage in an illegal transaction. The response stated that the public interest in protecting children was "overwhelmingly" in favor of allowing the statute to become effective.

On June 28, 2013, after a hearing on the motion, the court granted a temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the law, stating that the plaintiff had satisfied the necessary elements. On July 8, the court ordered that a similar action, filed on June 26 by Internet Archive against the same defendants, would be consolidated with this case. 

An oral argument is scheduled for August 9, 2013.

Zhang Ziyi is an international motion picture actress who has appeared in films such as Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon and Memoirs of a Geisha. On June 14, 2012, Zhang filed a complaint in the Central District of California against the corporation China Free Press, Inc., alleged to be doing business as Boxun News, and Boxun News's owner, Weican Null Meng. The complaint alleged five claims: (1) libel per se, (2) false light invasion of privacy, (3) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, (4) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, and (5) unlawful and unfair business practices under California's Business and Professional Code.

The complaint asserted that Boxun News published three articles on its website that included statements that Zhang was a prostitute who had sexual relations with Chinese government officials, among others, and that she received "outlandish payments" for doing so. One article, it stated, claimed that Zhang was under investigation by Chinese authorities and had been banned from leaving China. According to the complaint, these reports had been republished by other media outlets around the world. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants "willfully, knowingly, oppressively, and maliciously conspired" to publish false and defamatory statements about Zhang in order to "damage her, harm her, expose her to hatred, contempt, ridicule and obloquy, damage her business, and wrongfully promote their own business interests" at her expense. In filing suit, Zhang sought: general, special, and punitive damages; attorney's fees; and injunctive relief.

On August 15, 2012, defendant Meng filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Meng, a resident of North Carolina, said he administered the Boxun News website from North Carolina and that the site's servers are leased from a Texas company. He claimed that the site generates no revenue and has limited user interaction. Thus, Meng asserted that his contacts with California did not satisfy due process. He argued that the claims did not arise from his California activities, and that there was no foreseeable harm from the allegedly tortious material. Meng also disputed Zhang's assertion that China Free Press was doing business as Boxun, stating that they were separate and distinct entities.

On August 17, 2012, while his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was pending, Meng filed a special motion to strike the complaint under California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 -- California's anti-SLAPP statute. Meng asserted that he fulfilled the requirements under § 4.25.16 because (1) his expressive conduct was made in furtherance of his right of petition or free speech, and (2) his speech was connected to a public issue. He claimed that Boxun News' status as a news reporting agency, and publishing a story dealing with "corruption at high levels of the Chinese government, are archetypical examples of conduct made in furtherance of protected speech." Because the allegedly defamatory statements included allegations of Zhang having allegedly unlawful affairs with Bo Xilai, a prominent politician in the Chinese Central Communist Party, the motion stated, the allegations were incidental to "a major political scandal." Thus, Meng argued that because Bo Xilai's fitness for an office of public trust was involved, reporting on the alleged affair was a matter of public interest. The motion stated, "While some elements of the scandal may seem trite, our own country's experience shows us that from seemingly small sexual acts, great political consequences may flow."

The motion to strike claimed that because Zhang was a public figure, due to her international fame, she needed to prove that Meng published the statements with actual malice. He claimed that she could not satisfy this, as Meng had relied on information from trusted sources, verified the information with an independent source, and adhered to proper journalistic standards practiced by mainstream newspapers. Meng also claimed that his sources were entitled to anonymity for this matter and that "outing them for prosecution in China [was] the sole purpose of this litigation." He argued that the underlying information was "too politically sensitive" for distribution without anonymity protections, stating, "This is no mere conjecture: Boxun reporters have been imprisoned for their contributions to the site." In his motion, Meng sought dismissal of the case, as well as costs and attorney's fees.

On January 4, 2013, Zhang filed oppositions to both of Meng's motions. In her opposition to Meng's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Zhang claimed that the court could exercise jurisdiction because Meng purposefully directed his conduct in California, Zhang's harm was likely to be felt in California, and Meng did not satisfy his burden to present a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.

Zhang's opposition to Meng's motion to strike argued that Meng failed to meet his burden under the anti-SLAPP statute. Zhang asserted that as a news outlet, Boxun News was not considered a public forum protected under the statute. She argued that the defamatory statements did not concern a matter of public interest -- giving examples of statements saying Zhang had several boyfriends -- as they had "nothing to do with Mr. Bo's fitness for office." Therefore, the opposition claimed, the defamatory statements were not related to any major political scandal, a public issue, or any public interest. Further, the opposition argued that even if a person is a public figure, not all discussion of her is a matter of public interest.

Zhang's opposition further argued that there was a probability that the plaintiff would prevail on her claims because she could satisfy the required elements and the allegedly defamatory statements caused her to lose at least two potential jobs. Furthermore, the opposition claimed that there was clear and convincing evidence that the defamatory statements were made with actual malice because (1) Meng's sources provided unsubstantiated information that was not first-hand knowledge, (2) Meng was skeptical of about reports he received and altered an article to try to make the story more believable, (3) Meng did not attempt to contact Zhang to get her side of the story before publishing, and (4) the articles "suggest a malicious campaign [and] increasingly take on a threatening tone," going beyond the ordinary practice of journalism. Alternatively, the opposition argued that if the court needed more evidence to prove actual malice, it should deny the motion so Zhang can obtain the names of the confidential sources and complete necessary discovery.

On January 11, 2013, Meng filed responses to both of Zhang’s oppositions. In his reply in support of his motion to dismiss, Meng claimed there was no personal jurisdiction because his conduct was not directed toward California and that the court’s jurisdiction over him would be unreasonable. In Meng’s reply in support of his motion to strike, he claimed his website was a public forum under the statute because “public access, rather than the public’s ability to comment, is the hallmark of a public forum.” Meng asserted that Zhang’s “role in the Bo Xilai affair is inherently of public interest.” He argued that the public’s interest in Zhang is heightened both by her celebrity and her involvement in the scandal, nothing that “the legal and political ramifications of her reported relations with Bo Xilai are of particular public interest.”

In his reply, Meng also argued that Zhang was not likely to prevail on the merits of the case, stating that even if the allegedly defamatory statements were false, the relevant question was whether Meng knew of their falsity. Meng argued that Zhang’s evidence failed to demonstrate that she could prove this and that she had not even contacted Meng regarding this matter. He claimed that the identities of his confidential sources were unnecessary to prove actual malice, and that more discovery would “not cure what ails the Plaintiff’s case” but would prejudice Meng. Meng argued that Zhang's request for disclosure of the sources did not pass the three-part test that federal courts rely on for determining when a journalist’s sources must be disclosed, citing the 2nd Circuit case Garland v. Torre, because (1) the information sought did not go to the heart of Zhang’s claim, (2) Zhang had not presented evidence showing she had attempted to get the information from alternative sources, and (3) the sole purpose of the lawsuit was in “an effort to silence Boxun News.”

As of July 15, 2013, no hearing has been scheduled regarding the motion to dismiss or the motion to strike.